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1. Introduction
Two years after the start of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), already a consid-
erable amount of experience has accumulated on the functioning of monetary and ﬁscal
policy in this new framework of macroeconomic policy design in the European Union
(EU). Monetary policy has been delegated to a supra-national authority, the European
Central Bank (ECB), with a complex framework of objectives, policy instruments and
decision making procedures. According to the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB should safe-
guard price stability in the EMU and – subject to the condition that it does not interfere
with price stability – promote economic growth in the EMU. Its policies are therefore
directed at controlling economic developments of the EMU economy as a whole rather
than on individual countries. The design of ﬁscal policies in the EMU is complicated
by the set of constraints on national ﬁscal policy imposed by the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP). According to the SGP, excessive deﬁcits are to be avoided and are subject
to sanctions.230 VAN AARLE ET AL.
In a highly integrated economic area like the EU, policy cooperation is likely to
be of crucial importance because of the various interactions, spillovers and externali-
ties from national macroeconomic policies and the complicated design and transmission
of the common monetary policy of the ECB. This paper studies alternative regimes of
macroeconomic policy cooperation and their effects in a dynamic model of macroeco-
nomic adjustment in the EMU.
Macroeconomic policy cooperation has been one of the central issues in the theory
and practice of macroeconomic policy design. This concerns both the coordination of
macroeconomic policies within a country and the coordination of macroeconomic poli-
cies between different countries in the context of a multi-country setting where macro-
economic policy actions of one country are partly transmitted to the other countries
through various channels in goods, labour and ﬁnancial markets. These spillovers cre-
ate the rationale for policy cooperation. Apart from full cooperation, also settings with
partial cooperative coalitions, where only a subset of the players cooperates in their
policies, have been studied in the literature. In those cases, in particular the effects of
international monetary policy cooperation or international ﬁscal policy cooperation have
been analysed, mostly in a static model framework.
The potential gains from cooperation are usually in the middle of the interest in
studies of macroeconomic policy cooperation. Much less interest is given to the actual
division of gains from policy cooperation. Typically, an egalitarian or a Nash bargain-
ing division is assumed. In a multicountry context in general and the EMU in particular,
issues of coalition formation, distributions of (voting) power, the distribution of cooper-
ation gains and the stability of cooperative arrangements over time, however, are likely
to be of crucial importance and to have a potential strong effect on policy making. In
a dynamic setting these issues are even more important and complicated than in a sta-
tic setting. This paper therefore extensively analyses these aspects of macroeconomic
policy cooperation in the EMU, using a dynamic game approach.
Three policy regimes can be distinguished for a monetary union as the EMU:
(i) non-cooperative monetary and ﬁscal policies,
(ii) full cooperation,
(iii) partial cooperation.
This paper introduces into the literature an analysis of coalition formation in a
dynamic setting. Coalitions between countries and between the ECB and one country
are studied in case (iii). In case (ii), full coordination of all macroeconomic policies,
i.e., the national ﬁscal policies and the monetary policy of the ECB are implemented
in a cooperative framework. We also consider the effects of asymmetries in players’
preferences and structural parameters of the model.
Decision making procedures, coalition formation, voting power and rent sharing
inside the EU institutions have been studied in detail by, e.g., Widgrén [19], Laruelle
and Widgrén [14], Hosli [11], Bindseil [4], Bindseil and Hantke [5], Sutter [17] and
Levinsky and Silarsky [15]. These studies – while enabling us insights into issues ofMONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTION 231
power distribution and coalition formation in communal policy formation –, however,
do not consider a next step, namely the analysis of the effects of coalition formation and
power distribution on economic policies.
Engwerda et al. [8] have studied the effects of non-cooperative macroeconomic
policies in the EMU. They analyse macroeconomic stabilisation among three players
(two countries and the ECB) in a dynamic model of the EMU. Cooperation has been
analysed in Hughes Hallett and Ma [12], Acocella and Di Bartolomeo [3] and Engw-
erda et al. [9]. This paper extends these analysis by introducing coalition formation and
studies how these coalitions affect policies and adjustment in the EMU.
Theanalysis isstructured as follows: section 2proposes asimple dynamic model of
the EMUand formulates the dynamic stabilisation gamebetween the monetary and ﬁscal
policy makers in this setup. Sections 3 and 4 study, theoretically, the various equilibria
of this dynamic stabilisation game and the resulting design of the common monetary
policy and the national ﬁscal policies. Section 5 studies in detail numerical examples
to obtain a deeper insight into the economic properties of the model. The appendices
provide details about algorithms and calculations in the analytical part of the paper.
2. A dynamic EMU model
To study macroeconomic policy design in the EMU we use the comprehensive model
of the EMU used by Engwerda et al. [9]. There we considered the scenario where the
EMU consists of two symmetric, equally sized (blocks of) countries that share a com-
mon central bank, the ECB. In this paper we consider also asymmetric settings and the
symmetric Engwerda et al. [9] model is interpreted as a benchmark scenario. The model
ignores the external interaction of the EMU countries with the non-EMU countries and
also the dynamic implications of government debt and net foreign asset accumulation. It
consists of the following equations:
y1(t)=δ1s(t)− γ1r1(t) + ρ1y2(t) + η1f1(t), (1)
y2(t)=−δ2s(t)− γ2r2(t) + ρ2y1(t) + η2f2(t), (2)
s(t)=p2(t) − p1(t), (3)
ri(t)=iE(t) −˙ pi(t), i ∈{ 1,2}, (4)
mi(t) − pi(t)=κiyi(t) − λiiE(t), i ∈{ 1,2}, (5)
˙ pi(t)=ξiyi(t), i ∈{ 1,2}, (6)
in which yi denotes the real output, s competitiveness of country 2 vis-à-vis country 1,
ri the real interest rate, pi the price level, fi the real ﬁscal deﬁcit, iE the nominal interest
rate and mi the nominal money balances of country (block) i ∈{ 1,2}. All variables are
in logarithms, except for the interest rate which is in perunages, and denote deviations
from their long term equilibrium (balanced growth path) that has been normalised to
zero, for simplicity. A dot above a variable denotes its time derivative.
Equations (1), (2) represent output in the EMU countries as a function of compet-
itiveness in intra-EMU trade, the real interest rate, the foreign output and the domestic232 VAN AARLE ET AL.
ﬁscal deﬁcit. Competitiveness is deﬁned in (3) as the output price differential. Real in-
terest rates are deﬁned in (4) as the difference between the EMU wide nominal interest
rate, iE, and domestic inﬂation. Note that (4) imply that, temporarily, real interest rates
may diverge among countries if inﬂation rates are different. (5) provide the demand for
the common currency where it is assumed that the money market is in equilibrium. No-
tice that structural model (1)–(6) is a model with an integrated economy with several
kinds of cross country effects. Besides the common nominal interest rate there are two
other important direct cross-country spillovers that affect domestic output:
(i) the intra-EMU competitiveness channel (as measured by the elasticity δ), and
(ii) the foreign output channel (as measured by the elasticity ρ).
It is assumed that the common nominal interest rate is set by the ECB. Alterna-
tively, we could have assumed – as in Engwerda et al. [8] – that a monetary target-
ing strategy is implemented by the ECB. In that scenario, the ECB controls the com-
mon money supply and the common money market is cleared by the common interest
rate. Whereas related, both approaches differ to some degree in their transmission of
the ECB’s monetary policy. Rather than the monetary targeting approach, the interest
rate targeting approach is proposed here. This seems to be somewhat closer to the pol-
icy strategy adopted by the ECB in practice. Domestic output and inﬂation are related
through a Phillips curve type relation in (6).
The model (1)–(6) can be reduced to two output equations:




























,k 1 := 1 − γ1ξ1,k 2 := 1 − γ2ξ2.
The dynamics of the model are then represented by the following ﬁrst-order linear dif-
ferential equation with competitiveness, s(t), as the scalar state variable and the national
ﬁscal deﬁcits, fi(t), i ∈{ 1,2}, and the common interest rate, iE(t), as control variables:















φ3 := ξ1c1 − ξ2c2 and φ4 := −(ξ2b2 + ξ1b1).MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTION 233
The initial value of the state variable, s0, measures any initial disequilibrium in intra-
EMU competitiveness. Such an initial disequilibrium in competitiveness could be the
result of, e.g., differences in ﬁscal policies in the past or some initial disturbance in one
country.
We assume that the ﬁscal authorities control their ﬁscal policy instrument so as to
minimise the following quadratic loss functions that feature the countries’ concern to-
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−θt dt, i ∈{ 1,2}, (10)
in which θ denotes the rate of time preference and αi, βi and χi (i ∈{ 1,2}) represent
preference weights that are attached to the stabilisation of inﬂation, output and ﬁscal
deﬁcits, respectively. Preference for a low ﬁscal deﬁcit reﬂects the costs of excessive
deﬁcits such as proposed in the SGP that sanctions such excessive deﬁcits in the EMU.
Moreover, costs could also result from undesirable debt accumulation and intergener-
ational redistribution that high deﬁcits imply and, in that interpretation, χi could also
reﬂect the priority attached to ﬁscal retrenchment and consolidation.
As stipulated in the Maastricht Treaty, the ECB directs the common monetary pol-
icy at stabilising inﬂation and, as long as not in contradiction to inﬂation stabilisation,
stabilising output in the aggregate EMU economy. Moreover, we will assume that the
active use of monetary policy implies costs for the monetary policymaker: other things
equal it would like to keep its policy instrument constant, avoiding large swings. Con-





















Alternatively, we could consider a case where the ECB is governed by national
interests rather than by EMU-wide objectives.3 In that scenario, the ECB would be a
coalition of the (former) national central banks that decide cooperatively on the common
monetary policy that is based on individual, national interests rather than on EMU-wide
1 Note that in a monetary union the ﬁscal players are assumed not to have any direct control over the
nominal interest rate since this control is generally left for the common central bank (see, among others,
Gros and Hefeker [10], Acocella and Di Bartolomeo [3]).
2 αE and βE are the preference parameters with respect to inﬂation and output respectively of equation (14)
in Engwerda et al. [8], where αE := 1 because of normalisation.
3 See also Gros and Hefeker [10]. These authors compare, in a static framework, a speciﬁcation of the
ECB’s cost function based on national variables with the standard one (11) as in Cukierman [6]. They
discuss the welfare implications of the two speciﬁcations. Also van Aarle et al. [1] and De Grauwe [7]
compare outcomes under an ECB’s objective function based on aggregate and national variables, respec-
tively.234 VAN AARLE ET AL.
objectives. In this scenario the monetary policy of the ECB will typically be more sen-
sitive to individual country variables. Then the ECB seeks to minimise a loss function,
which is assumed to be quadratic in the individual countries’ inﬂation rates and outputs






















Disregarding the monetary instrument, which in this paper is the interest rate rather
than the money supply, the objective (11) can be seen as a generalisation of the loss
function used in Engwerda et al. [8, expression (14), p. 262]. The loss function in (12)
can also be interpreted as a loss function in which the ECB is a coalition of national
central bankers which all have a share in the decision making proportional to the size of
their economies.
Below, we will (for notational convenience) only elaborate the problem if the ECB
objective is (11). In a similar way appropriate formulae can be directly obtained if (12)
is used as the ECB’s performance criterion.



























where di := αiξ2
i + βi,d iE := α2
iEξ2
i + β2
iE with i ∈{ 1,2} and d3E := α1Eα2Eξ1ξ2 +
β1Eβ2E
4.





































4 In the case that national variables feature in the ECB objective function, as in (12), we have diE =
αiEξ2
i + βiE with i ={ 1,2} and d3E = 0.MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTION 235























Henceforth, for reasons of convenience, we assume that θ = 0. If θ differs from
zero, the model can be easily solved following the same procedure used in this paper
after a simple transformation of variables.5 All that changes in the ensueing results is
that the parameter φ4 has to be substituted by φ4 − 1
2θ.
3. Macroeconomic policy design in the EMU
This section studies alternative modes of policy cooperation in a monetary union as the
EMU. We study macroeconomic policy design and macroeconomic adjustment in three
alternative macroeconomic policy regimes:
(i) non-cooperative macroeconomic policies,
(ii) full cooperation and
(iii) partial cooperation.
The ﬁrst two regimes are standard in macroeconomic policy analysis. The regimes
where subgroups of players form coalitions in which they coordinate their policies but
interact in a non-cooperative manner with the players that are not part of the coalition,
is not dealt with usually, certainly not in a dynamic context. This is not because such
cases would be less interesting or less relevant in practice, but rather because of a lack
of analytical tools to analyse such cases. In regimes of partial cooperation, important
questions need to be answered, like
(i) Why certain coalitions arise and others not?,
(ii) Do these coalitions display stability over time?,
(iii) How are the gains from cooperation distributed between the members of the coali-
tions?,
(iv) How do differences in initial conditions, economic structures and policy prefer-
ences affect outcomes in this scenario?
In this paper the issues (iii) and (iv) can be answered whereas some insight can be
provided about the coalition formation issue. The stability issue will not be dealt with in
this paper.
5 That is, transforming x(t)into e−(1/2)θtx(t) (see Engwerda et al. [8, p. 263] for further details).236 VAN AARLE ET AL.
A study of all three regimes is necessary for a complete insight on macroeconomic
policy design in the EMU. The regimes with either fully non-cooperative or fully coop-
erative policies are clearly the two extreme forms of policy formulation. Forms of partial
cooperation combine elements of these opposite policy regimes as the following analysis
shows. Since in this analysis the speciﬁc choice of the loss function from the ECB does
not play any role, for notational convenience this dependency is dropped and we will
just use, e.g., ME instead of MA
E and MN
E .
3.1. The non-cooperative case
In the non-cooperative case players minimise their cost functions (15), (16) with respect
to the dynamic law of motion (9) of the system. From appendix A.1 we ﬁnd as equilib-







  a1b1 − φ1K1
−a2b2 + φ1K2




where the contents of matrices Gand Ki (i = 1,2,3) can be obtained from theappendix.
To stress the fact that we are dealing with the non-cooperative case we denote the cost
of the players by Ji,nc, i ∈{ 1,2,E}, respectively. Furthermore, the resulting system
is described by the differential equation ˙ s(t) =− ancs(t) with s(0) = s0, where the
adjustment speed, anc, is obtained as the positive eigenvalue of some related matrix
that is deﬁned in appendix A.1. Using the equilibrium controls (17) we obtain then the
















































































,i ={ 1,2},j= nc. (22)
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3.2. The cooperative case
In the full cooperative case players minimise a common cost function: J C := τ1J1 +
τ2J2 + τ3JE subject to (9); τi (i ∈{ 1,2,3}) equals the player i’s bargaining power with
τ1 + τ2 + τ3 = 1. In appendix A.2 we show that the equilibrium cooperative controls






Using these controls the dynamic behaviour of this system is described as: ˙ s(t) =
−acs(t) with s(0) = s0,w h e r eac is again a positive eigenvalue of some matrix that
is deﬁned in appendix A.2. The corresponding optimal costs for the players are (22),
(23) with j = c.
3.3. Cases with coalitions of policymakers
To determine the equilibrium open-loop solution for partial coalitions we will concen-
trate on the case that the ﬁscal authority of country 1 and the ECB coordinate their
policies but act in a non-cooperative fashion with the ﬁscal authority of country 2. For
this case we will use the shorthand notation coalition (1,E).
Todetermine the equilibrium solution forthe (1,E)coalition werewrite the system
equation as:





+ φ2f2,s ( 0) = s0,
and consider the performance criteria J(1,E) := τ1J1 + τ2JE with τ1 + τ2 = 1a st h e
aggregate performance of player 1 and the ECB, and J2 for player 2, respectively. Next,






















(note that P(1,E) is an (orthogonal) permutation matrix). Now, we can, basically, use the






Using these equilibrium strategies, the system is described by: ˙ s(t) =− a(1,E)s(t)
with s(0) = s0,w h e r ea(1,E) is again obtained as the positive eigenvalue of some matrix.
The optimal costs for the players are (22), (23) with j = (1,E). The partial coali-
tions (2,E)and (1,2) are deﬁned similarly and the equilibrium strategies are derived
analogously.238 VAN AARLE ET AL.
3.4. Some coalition formation terminology
In order to obtain some insight into the question which coalition(s) might be realised and
which is (are) less plausible, we introduce some terminology. Each of the ﬁve policy
regimes outlined in the above subsections is called a coalition form and each group of
two or more players that cooperate in a coalition form a coalition. We say that a certain
coalition form is supported by player i,i fp l a y e ri has no incentive to deviate from
this coalition form. If a coalition form has a coalition, then we say that this coalition
form is internally supported if all players in the coalition support the coalition form.
A coalition form is called externally supported if all players outside the coalition support
the coalition form. If a coalition form is both externally and internally supported, then
we will call this coalition form sustainable, that is, in such a coalition form no player
has an incentive to deviate (leave this coalition form). Finally, we call a coalition form
unsustainable if as well players inside as outside the coalition can improve by joining
another coalition form.
Note that a coalition form which is internally supported is in principle viable.O n e
reason why such a coalition form might not be realised is that, e.g., side-payments take
place. Here we will ignore these issues. A similar remark holds with respect to the un-
sustainable coalition form. Such a coalition form is in principle not viable, this contrary
to a coalition form which is partially supported (i.e., supported by not all players in the
coalition). Such a coalition form might be viable, but this typically depends on what
other coalition forms have to offer for all the different player(s). So, this requires a more
detailed description of the negotiation process, something we will not go into here. The
notions introduced above will in particular be used in the simulation study.
4. The symmetric case
In this section we consider the model described in the previous sections under the as-
sumption of symmetry of country 1 and 2. In that case one can obtain theoretical results.
The outcomes of this analysis are not only interesting on their own, but may be also
helpfull in analysing the properties of the non-symmetric model. We make the follow-
ing assumptions with respect to the various parameters:
α1 = α2,α 1E = α2E,β 1 = β2,β 1E = β2E,χ 1 = χ2,ξ 1 = ξ2,
γ1 = γ2,ρ 1 = ρ2,δ 1 = δ2,η 1 = η2,λ 1 = λ2 and κ1 = κ2.
Furthermore we introduce for notational convenience the following parameters:
a := a1,e :=
ρ1
k1





























Then, the dynamics are given by the state equation
˙ s = φ4s − φ1f1 + φ1f2,s ( 0) = s0.MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTION 239
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4.1. The various equilibrium strategies
In appendix B we calculate various parameters that are essential for calculating the equi-
librium strategies for the non-cooperative coalition (nc); the cooperative coalition (c),
with τ1 = τ2 = τ and τ3 = 1 − 2τ,w h e r e0 τ  1
2; and the ﬁscal coalition
(1,2), with τ1 = τ2 = 1
2. These parameters are presented in table 1. Substitution of
these parameters into the equilibrium strategies determined in appendix A yields then
straightforwardly the equilibrium strategies presented below. It turns out that as well for
the non-cooperative as the ﬁscal coalition case the strategies for the national and aggre-
gate performance case are the same. Only for the cooperative case the strategies depend
on the ECB’s preference function. For that reason we discern below two cooperative












and the corresponding cost for the players is:
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E,i = 0. (25)240 VAN AARLE ET AL.
for i = nc,cA,cN,(1,2). Here:
Table 1
Policy parameters for the symmetric case.
i nc cN cA (1,2)
ui a(a − e) + gτ g + dN
E (a − e)2 τ(g+ (a − e)2)g + (a − e)2
a2















(φ4 + ac)ucN + 2dN












E b(a − e)
ucN
φ1KcA − τb(a− e)
ucA
2φ1K(1,2) − b(a − e)
u(1,2)
with u := 2φ4unc + bφ1(3a − e).
If the coalition (1,E) occurs (or its symmetric counterpart (2,E))t h eE M Ui s
directly involved in the game (i.e., the common interest rate differs in general from zero).
As a consequence the theoretical formulae become much more involved. Therefore they
are omitted.
4.2. Some general conclusions
First, we summarize some conclusions with respect to the number of equilibria that may
appear in the game.
Theorem 1. For the cooperative and (1,2) coalition the game has always a unique equi-
librium. If e<athe non-cooperative game also has a unique equilibrium. If e  a the
number of equilibria may vary between zero and two (see Engwerda et al. [9, table 2]
for details).
We will restrict in the rest of this section to the case that e<aand will assume,
moreover, that as well −φ4 as a are positive. For a broad class of realistic model parame-
ters these assumptions hold (in particular the positivity condition on −φ4 is satisﬁed if
one chooses the discount factor θ large enough). As a consequence, the non-cooperative
game has a uniquely deﬁned equilibrium. Furthermore, unless stated otherwise, we will
restrict our analysis to the non-cooperative, the cooperative and the coalition structure
(1,2).
Two striking things we observe from the previous section are that f1(t) =− f2(t)
and that the Central Bank does not inﬂuence the game, neither in a direct way (i.e.,
iE(t) = 0) nor in an indirect way (i.e., via its parameters). These statements do not hold
for the coalition form (1,E). There, the ﬁscal instruments differ and the Central Bank
uses its instruments actively to reach its goals. The symmetry assumptions are crucial
too, if they are dropped the Central Bank gets also actively involved into the game.MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTION 241
Since we have explicit formulae for the various cost functions we can exploit these
to derive some further general conclusions. Our ﬁrst observation (see appendix C) is that
the convergence speed of the resulting system satisﬁes some nice properties:
Lemma 2.
(i) acN  a(1,2).
(ii) anc  acN if 3τ  2dN,w h e r edN := τ + (1 − 2τ)(dN
E /d).
(iii) ai(g) is an increasing function with





(iv) acN  acA.
With respect to the performance criteria we ﬁrst note that the ﬁscal players’ cost
in the coalition case, with the ECB considering an aggregate performance criterion, and
the (1,2) coalition coincide. In other words, the ﬁscal players are indifferent between
these modes of play. This is most easily seen by ﬁrst noting that both acA and pcA are
independent of τ. As a consequence, the corresponding cost for the ﬁscal players is in
this cooperative case independent of τ too. Next substitute τ = 1
2 into the “aggregate”
coalition cost function. It is easily veriﬁed that this cost function coincides with the
cost for the (1,2) coalition, which shows the correctness of the claim for an arbitrarily
chosen τ.
Our next results concern the national performance criterion. We show, amongst
others, that the Central Bank will prefer a non-cooperative above a cooperative mode of
play if the cooperation parameter τ becomes large and that the ﬁscal players will prefer
a partial coalition above a cooperative mode of play. The proof is again deferred to the
appendix C. We used the notation sgn(a) here to denote the sign of variable a.
Lemma 3.
(i) sgn(J N
E,nc − J N
E,cN) = sgn(anc − acN).
(ii) Ji,cN  Ji,(1,2),i∈{ 1,2}.
From lemmas 2(ii) and 3(i) we have that if, e.g., 3τ  2dN,a l w a y sJ N
E,cN  J N
E,nc.
A more detailed analysis shows that if τ = 0,J N
E,cN <J N
E,nc, and therefore it is easily
seen from the proof of lemma 2(ii) that there is always a threshold τ∗ such that for all
τ  τ∗, J N
E,cN  J N
E,nc and for all τ<τ ∗, J N
E,cN <JN
E,nc.
Now, consider the case that τ  τ∗. Since aggregate performance is minimized in
the cooperative situation and according lemma 2(ii) the Central Bank’s cost are higher
in this situation than in the non-cooperative case, the cost of the ﬁscal players will be
less in the cooperative mode of play than in the non-cooperative case. A similar rea-
soning shows that since Ji,cN  Ji,(1,2),i∈{ 1,2}, the cost of the Central Bank in the
coalition (1,2) mode of play will always be larger than in the cooperative case. Stated242 VAN AARLE ET AL.
differently, we see that under this assumption the Central Bank will always prefer the
non-cooperative mode of play, whereas the ﬁscal players prefer the coalition (1,2) mode
of play. So, summarizing, we have:
Theorem 4. Assume that the ECB considers the national performance criterion. Then,
there exists a number τ∗ such that if τ  τ∗, the cooperative mode of play is unsustain-
able.
5. A simulation study
In this section we consider the differential game on macroeconomic stabilisation in the
EMU that was set up in section 2, using simulations of a stylised example. We analyse
ﬁve scenarios:
(i) a symmetric baseline case in which countries are of equal size, all structural and
preference parameters are the same in both countries,
(ii) an asymmetric case where the EMU countries differ in stabilisation preferences,
(iii) an asymmetric case where countries differ in monetary policy transmission,
(iv) an asymmetric case where countries differ in bargaining powers in case they enter
coalitions and
(v) an asymmetric case where countries differ in sensitivity to intra-EMU competitive-
ness.
In this way our analysis contributes to the important discussion about the implica-
tions for policymaking in EMU in case countries differ in their structural characteristics.
Outcomes are analysed for all the ﬁve different equilibria outlined in section 3.
5.1. Baseline: A symmetric EMU
In the symmetric baseline case both countries are of equal size and all structural and
preference parameters are the same. The following values for the structural model para-
meters are used:6
γ = 0.4,δ = 0.2,ρ = 0.4,η = 1,κ = 1,λ = 1a n dξ = 0.25.
The initial state of intra-EMU competitiveness equals s0 = 0.05 (implying an initial
disequilibrium of 5% in competitiveness between the two countries). Concerning the
preference weights in the objective functions of the ﬁscal players, the following values
have been assumed:
α = 2,β = 5,χ = 2.5a n dθ = 0.15.
6 See Engwerda et al. [9] for a similar simulation set up. The parameter choices are related to those used in
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In the ECB’s loss function both countries are equally weighted. Furthermore, the ECB
– in contrast to the ﬁscal players – cares more about inﬂation than about output sta-
bilisation and has also an interest rate smoothing objective: α1E = α2E = 0.8,
β1E = β2E = 0.5, and χE equals 2.5. Figure 1 displays the adjustment in the case
the aggregate objective function (11) of the ECB is used (adjustment in the case where
the national objective function (12) of the ECB is used is almost identical and therefore
not displayed here).
The adjustment of intra-EMU competitiveness is given in panel (a). The adjust-
ments of the policy variables are found in panels (b)–(d). The initial disequilibrium in
intra-EMU competitiveness implies that output in country 1 is initially above the long-
run equilibrium in country 1 and below the long-run equilibrium in country 2. This in-
duces restrictive ﬁscal policies in country 1 and expansionary ﬁscal policies in country 2.
The dose of these ﬁscal stabilisation, however, varies according the type of equilibrium.
In the EMU there is a stabilisation externality: the restrictive ﬁscal policy implemented
by country 1 to stabilise its economy, is harmful for country 2 which would beneﬁt from
an expansionary ﬁscal policy in country 1. Coalitions offer potentially a solution to such
policy coordination problems. In the Pareto case and the ﬁscal cooperation case (which
coincide in this symmetric case), the ﬁscal players internalise the spillovers from their
ﬁscal instrument on the other country. A similar externality results from the ﬁscal policy
in country 2. The common interest rate, panel (b), only reacts in the case of a coalition
with one ﬁscal policy maker: in that case the common interest rate is partly targeted at
the situation in the country with which the ECB has formed a coalition. This leads to a
higher interest rate in case a coalition is formed with country 1 and a lower interest rate
when a coalition is formed with country 2. Panels (e) and (f) display output in country 1
and 2 in the different cases. Table 2 gives the resulting welfare losses that the players
incur in this example. Aggregate cost refers to the case where the ECB has (11) as its
objective function, national cost to (12).
In this symmetric case we recognise from ﬁgure 1 and table 2 the features that we
have derived analytically in section 4. In the case the ECB is using aggregate variables in
its objective function, we know that the adjustment speed and losses in the Pareto and ﬁs-
cal coalition form will coincide. Both equilibria are sustainable in this case, whereas the
coalitions (1,E)and (2,E)are unsustainable. One reason for this last ﬁnding is likely
to be the fact that the countries and the ECB have very different objectives. Firstly, the
ECB is here oriented towards stabilisation of EMU aggregate ﬂuctuations and, secondly,
it cares more about inﬂation than output stabilisation. The ﬁscal players on the other
hand are only interested in stabilisation of their own economy and attach a larger weight
to output than to inﬂation stabilisation. The coalitions between a ﬁscal player and the
ECB result in a slow adjustment speed, a feature that we will notice also in the other
cases. This is also suggestive for the possible inefﬁcient policies that may result when
these coalitions are chosen. For the case of the loss function (12) of the ECB, we know
from lemma 3 that the adjustment speed (measured by the size of the ais) is fastest under
ﬁscal cooperation, which is in addition an internally supported equilibrium in the sym-244 VAN AARLE ET AL.
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Table 2
Cost functions baseline (multiplied by 1,000).
Aggregate cost National cost
Nash Pareto (1,2)( 1,E) (2,E) Nash Pareto (1,2)( 1,E) (2,E)
J1 0.3596 0.3032 0.3032 0.4145 2.4911 0.3596 0.3040 0.3032 0.4169 2.4909
J2 0.3596 0.3032 0.3032 2.4911 0.4145 0.3596 0.3040 0.3032 2.4909 0.4169
JE 0 0 0 0.0088 0.0088 0.0189 0.0390 0.0423 0.0188 0.0188
acl 0.1007 0.1162 0.1162 0.0933 0.0933 0.1007 0.1143 0.1162 0.0932 0.0932
metric case. Note that both the (1,E)and (2,E)coalitions are supported by the ECB
and that the Pareto coalition is unsustainable (conform theorem 4).
5.2. Asymmetric ﬁscal policy preferences
An important form of asymmetry that is likely to arise in EMU are different objectives
of the ﬁscal authorities of the participating countries. In this second example we analyse
the consequences of such asymmetries in preferences. To do so, assume that the ﬁscal
authority of the second country has now a higher preference for output stability than
country 2: β1 = 5a n dβ2 = 10.7 In that case the following adjustment patterns result.
Optimal policies and adjustment are quite different from the baseline case and also
between the two different objective functions of the ECB. With a larger desire to re-
duce output ﬂuctuations, country 2 wants to use its instrument with a larger intensity.
However, a larger use increases the instrument costs and implies costs also for country 1
who prefers a less active stabilisation policy of country 2. Table 3 indeed indicates that
the ﬁscal players have larger lossses in the Nash case compared to the symmetric case.
In the ﬁscal coalition case, country 1 is forced to share in the larger adjustment needs
of country 2: it pursues a less active ﬁscal stabilisation policy since its ﬁscal surpluses
also negatively affect country 2. In case the ECB participates in a coalition (i.e., in the
Pareto, the (1,E)and (2,E)) and has aggregate variables in its objective function, it also
shares in the increased stabilisation problem of country 2 (and the reduced problems of
country 1): it sets a low interest rate which helps the stabilisation of output in country 2.
This, however, at the cost of country 1 for whom this policy is counterproductive. In case
national variables are featuring in the objective function of the ECB, on the other hand,
the ECB sets a restrictive interest policy, this reduces inﬂation in country 2 but also the
amount of output stabilisation in that country.
Unfortunately, coalitions are unlikely to offer a solution here. The reason is that
there are no internally supported coalitions in this case: in the case (7a) is the objective
function of the ECB, country 2 would prefer the Pareto case over the ﬁscal coalition and
in case (7b) is the objective function of the ECB, country 1 would prefer the Pareto case
over the ﬁscal coalition. In both cases, the ECB, however, does not support the Pareto
policy design. Therefore, the Nash case remains the only likely outcome given that we
7 In Engwerda et al. [8] and Engwerda [9], we experimented extensively with variations of the the χ para-
meter of the ﬁscal players which measures the preference for deﬁcit smoothing.246 VAN AARLE ET AL.
Figure 2. Asymmetric policy preferences, β1 = 5,β 2 = 10. Aggregate objective function ECB. – Nash,
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Figure 3. Asymmetric policy preferences, β1 = 5,β 2 = 10. National objective function ECB. – Nash,
---P a r e t o ,···(1,2), −-− (1,E), −·−(2,E).248 VAN AARLE ET AL.
Table 3
Cost functions asymmetric ﬁscal policy preferences.
Aggregate cost National cost
Nash Pareto (1,2)( 1,E) (2,E) Nash Pareto (1,2)( 1,E) (2,E)
J1 0.4070 0.3842 0.3707 0.9028 2.5718 0.4628 0.3973 0.3981 0.4645 3.0045
J2 0.4432 0.3343 0.3511 6.1842 0.4848 0.4175 0.2127 0.2100 5.0387 0.4169
JE 0.0013 0.0033 0.0038 0.0257 0.0070 0.0089 0.0346 0.0399 0.0115 0.0188
acl 0.0958 0.1107 0.1105 0.0794 0.0909 0.0906 0.1084 0.1100 0.0884 0.0932
Table 4
Costs with asymmetric monetary policy transmission.
Aggregate cost National cost
Nash Pareto (1,2)( 1,E) (2,E) Nash Pareto (1,2)( 1,E) (2,E)
J1 0.3697 0.3437 0.3065 0.5596 3.1561 0.3759 0.3483 0.3140 0.5608 3.1560
J2 0.3919 0.2596 0.3221 1.8148 0.3405 0.3812 0.2557 0.3084 1.8107 0.3405
JE 0 0.0091 0 0.0217 0.0502 0.0174 0.0430 0.0430 0.0301 0.0569
acl 0.0994 0.1155 0.1165 0.0910 0.0894 0.0994 0.1135 0.1165 0.0909 0.0894
had excluded any side-payments in the coalition formation problem or any other binding
arrangement to sustain coalitions of policymakers.
5.3. Asymmetric monetary policy transmission
In this example asymmetric monetary transmission is analysed: the baseline setting is
again assumed, except that the ﬁrst country has a smaller output semi-elasticity of the
real interest rate (γ1 = 0.4) than the second country (γ2 = 0.8). This example is useful
to illustrate the important discussion about the effects of a common monetary policy
in a situation where countries differ in the transmission of monetary policy. Figures 4
displays the resulting adjustments. Since adjustment with EMU aggregate and national
variables in the ECB loss function is rather similar, we depict only the ﬁrst case here.
In this asymmetric setting the adjustment and policy strategies are not symmetric
in both countries, although the deviations from the symmetric baseline case are not as
large as in the previous example. The ECB now reacts in all strategic settings as its ob-
jective functions imply that its optimal strategy is sensitive to any asymmetry. Because
the economy of country 2 is more sensitive to the common monetary policy, the mone-
tary policy of the ECB is more directed to stabilisation in country 2, in particular when
the ECB enters into a coalition with country 2. Table 4 shows the losses in this case.
We observe that there is no sustainable coalition neither for the aggregate vari-
ables nor for the national variables case. Without side payments or other institutional
arrangements that would make a coalition binding, we would ﬁnd the Nash case to be
the likely outcome. We further observe that for both welfare loss functions the Pareto
coalition form is supported by player 2, whereas player 1 supports the governments’
coalition form. Furthermore we see that both other partial equilibrium forms are unsus-MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTION 249
Figure 4. Asymmetric monetary transmission, γ1 = 0.4,γ 2 = 0.8. Aggregate objective function ECB.
– Nash, - - - Pareto, ···(1,2), −-− (1,E), −·−(2,E).250 VAN AARLE ET AL.
tainable. Note that the ﬁscal coalition is now only second best for country 2. Because of
its stronger exposure now to the monetary policy of the ECB, country 2 would deﬁnitely
prefer the ECB to be included into the policy cooperation. However, the ECB is not
beneﬁting from full cooperation, it incurs a relatively large cost by joining this coalition
form (in the aggregate case).
5.4. Asymmetric bargaining powers
In cases with policy coordination, bargaining strenghts of players become important,
since these will determine too how collective decision making will be inﬂuenced by
the objectives of the players in the coalition. This will therefore have important conse-
quences for macroeconomic policy formulation and adjustment in the EMU. This ex-
ample, therefore, analyses the effects of different bargaining powers under cooperative





































implying that in a coalition country 1 has three times as many votes as country 2 and 1,5
as many votes as the ECB, whereas the ECB has two times as many votes as country 2.
This asymmetric bargaining power case leads to the following adjustment dynamics.
The Nash case is not affected by the different bargaining strengths as it implies
entirely non-cooperative policy design. Intheother cases, thebalance ofpower isturning
against country 2 in particular when it enters the ﬁscal coalition and a coalition with the
ECB. In those cases, it faces a larger adjustment burden and contributing more to the
stabilisation burden of the other coalition partner. In the case it acts non-cooperatively
against the coalition of country 1 and the ECB, the adverse effects for country 2 are
much less. In the Pareto case it is helped by an expansionary monetary policy of the
ECB.
In this case player 1 supports the Pareto coalition form, since it is very powerful
there. Furthermore, all coalition forms are unsustainable. Since none of the coalitions
is supported by more than one player, the Nash outcome might be the ultimate outcome
in this case. Therefore, comparing the results of table 5 with that of table 2, we observe
that the introduction of asymmetric bargaining powers crucially changes the results of
the game. The asymmetry increases the cost of the country with the smaller bargaining
Table 5
Cost with asymmetric bargaining powers.
Aggregate cost National cost
Nash Pareto (1,2)( 1,E) (2,E) Nash Pareto (1,2)( 1,E) (2,E)
J1 0.3596 0.1866 0.2266 0.3724 2.4267 0.3596 0.2534 0.2555 0.4663 2.4911
J2 0.3596 0.4759 0.4546 2.6170 0.5062 0.3596 0.3672 0.3755 2.4302 0.5900
JE 0 0.0213 0.0078 0.0222 0.0047 0.0189 0.0416 0.0486 0.0134 0.0151
acl 0.1007 0.1199 0.1215 0.0940 0.0910 0.1007 0.1135 0.1183 0.0921 0.0888MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTION 251
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Figure 6. Asymmetric sensitivity to intra-EMU competitiveness, δ1 = 0.2,δ 2 = 0.4. Aggregate objective
function ECB. – Nash, - - - Pareto, ···(1,2), −-− (1,E), −·−(2,E).MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTION 253
Table 6
Costs with asymmetric competitiveness.
Aggregate cost National cost
Nash Pareto (1,2)( 1,E) (2,E) Nash Pareto (1,2)( 1,E) (2,E)
J1 0.2449 0.3479 0.3050 1.1165 2.5845 0.2449 0.3347 0.3050 1.0995 2.5837
J2 1.3824 0.9283 1.0375 8.7428 1.1306 1.3824 0.9437 1.0375 8.7341 1.1381
JE 0.0117 0.0359 0.0029 0.2877 0.2253 0.0524 0.1202 0.0944 0.2898 0.2509
acl 0.1153 0.1412 0.1420 0.0919 0.1085 0.1153 0.1382 0.1420 0.0921 0.1083
power as its importance in a coalition is reduced, while it decreases the costs of the
other country. To put it in a general way: more asymmetric bargaining powers reduce
the probabilities of coalitions – and therefore of policy cooperation – as policies will
be biased towards the needs of the stronger player(s), and the smaller players are less
likely to stay in such “asymmetric” coalitions. This last result differs from that found in
Hughes Hallett and Ma [12] in analysing the full coordination problem.
5.5. Asymmetric degree of competitiveness
Next, we assume that the ﬁrst country’s output elasticity of competitiveness is lower
(δ1 = 0.2) than that of the second country (δ2 = 0.4). Such an asymmetry in the sensi-
tiveness tocompetitive pressures hasquite adramatic impact as acomparison ofﬁgures 1
and 6 shows.
In this case there are no marked differences between the cases where the ECB
objectives are governed by aggregate variables and where it is governed by national
variables and therefore only the ﬁrst case is displayed. Country 2 is now in a more dis-
advantaged position than in the baseline case: its higher sensitivity to the intra-EMU
competitiveness variable imply that it faces a deeper recession and a higher ﬁscal sta-
bilisation burden. The reduction of interest rates by the ECB that occurs in all cases is
helpful to stabilise country 2 but inadequate from the perspective of country 1. Table 6
gives the losses that the players incur in this case.
In both cases no coalition form is internally supported and its emergence is there-
fore hard to sustain without any form of other binding element. Coalitions (1,E)and
(2,E)are unsustainable, while in the aggregate case the coalition (1,2) is externally
supported by the ECB.
6. Conclusion
Macroeconomic policy cooperation is acrucial issue in a highly integrated economic and
political union such as the European Union. To study the effects of policy cooperation
in a two-country model for the EMU we compared the optimal policies and the effects
of ﬁve alternative policy regimes under a stylized model of the EMU:
(i) non-cooperative monetary and ﬁscal policies,254 VAN AARLE ET AL.
(ii) three partial cooperative schemes and
(iii) full cooperation.
Using numerical examples, we illustrated the sometimes complex effects that are
produced by the various coalitions. We found that the sustainability of a certain type of
coalition and its implications for the optimal strategies and the resulting macroeconomic
adjustment, is highly sensitive to initial settings of preferences and the structural model
parameters. Cooperation is often efﬁcient for the ﬁscal players and, moreover, we saw
that the ﬁscal players’ cooperation (against the ECB) often leads to a Pareto improve-
ment for them, provided that they are not very asymmetric in preferences, structural
characteristics and bargaining strenght. The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is most
likely to be the outcome when countries are more asymmetric. In most simulations full
cooperation does not induce a Pareto improvement for the ECB, while the governments’
coalitions imply a considerable loss for the ECB compared to the non-cooperative and
full cooperative cases. That implies that the Pareto form is often unsustainable. This was
also shown theoretically for the symmetric case. Cases that the ECB cooperates with
one government against the other, generally produces suboptimal monetary and ﬁscal
stabilisation policies.
Finally, considering current European discussions, it is found that the ECB has
a rational to pursue an institutional design that does not enforce cooperation and let
to the monetary authority a high degree of independence. Therefore, the ECB will try
to promote ﬁxed rules for European policy targets. On the other hand, governments
may pursue a design based on cooperation and which that leave them independent in
cooperating their policies with the monetary policy of the ECB.
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Appendix A
A.1. The non-cooperative case
With A := φ4,B 1 := −φ1,B 2 := φ2 and B3 := φ3 the system is described by
˙ s(t) = As(t) + B1f1(t) + B2f2(t) + B3iE(t), s(0) = s0,MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTION 255
and with x := (s f1 f2 iE) the performance criterion of player i can be rewritten as   ∞
0 x(t)Mix(t)dt, i ∈{ 1,2,E}. The non-cooperative Nash solution is found as follows
(see Engwerda et al. [8] for details (note that we present here the general multivariable
algorithm, whereas in our case many variables are scalar)):





Qi Pi Li Si
P T





























































Here B := (B1 B2 B3) and   Pi := (Pi Li Si), i ∈{ 1,2,E}.
3. Calculate the positive eigenvalue(s) of M.I f anc is a positive eigenvalue and v =:
(v0 v1 v2 v3)T a corresponding eigenvector then, generically (see Engwerda et al. [8]



















where Ki := vi/v0. Using these equilibrium strategies the resulting system is de-
scribed by ˙ s(t) =− ancs(t), s(0) = s0.
A.2. The cooperative case
To determine the cooperative strategies for this model we consider: J C := τ1J1+τ2J2+
τ3JE with τ1 + τ2 + τ3 = 1. Introducing µ1 := d1τ1,µ 2 := d2τ2 and µi
3 := di














C := µ1M1 + µ2M2 + µi
3Mi
E,i∈{ A,N}.
With the notation of appendix A.1 the unique equilibrium strategies are then ob-
tained as follows (see, e.g., Lancaster et al. [13]):256 VAN AARLE ET AL.







where Q is a scalar; S a1× 3 matrix and R a3× 3 matrix.
2. Calculate the Hamiltonian matrix
Ham :=
 
−(A − BR−1ST)B R −1BT
Q − SR−1ST (A − BR−1ST)T
 
.
3. Determine the positive eigenvalue ac of Ham and its corresponding eigenvector v =:
(v0 v1)T. Calculate K := v1/v0.












and the resulting system satisﬁes ˙ s(t) =− acs(t), s(0) = s0.
A.3. Partial coalitions
We will elaborate the (1,E)coalition. The results for the other cases are obtained sim-
ilarly by considering the permutation matrix obtained from the appropriate redeﬁned
state x(t).
First note that the inverse of the permutation matrix P(1,E) is P T
(1,E) so that x(t) =
P T
(1,E)˜ x(t). Then, with M
(1,E)
i := P(1,E)MiP T














Next, introduce B1 := (−φ1 φ3), B2 := φ2 and B := (B1 B2).
Then, apply step 1 and 2 described in the above appendix A.1 for the two-player
case to ﬁnd a corresponding matrix M(1,E).
Determine the positive eigenvalue(s) of M(1,E).I f a(1,E) is a positive eigenvalue

















where Ki := vi/v0. The resulting system is then ˙ s(t) =− a(1,E)s(t), s(0) = s0.MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTERACTION 257
Appendix B
B.1. The non-cooperative case
Note that for the determination of the optimal strategies the scaling parameters in the
performance criteria are irrelevant in this case. Therefore, we assume di = 1. First, we
consider the national performance criterion J N
E .
To determine the equilibrium strategies we have to calculate the eigenvalues and
eigenvectors of the corresponding matrix M (see appendix A.1). By substitution of the
various parameters (with gE := gN
E) we obtain
G :=
  a2 + ga e−ac
ae a2 + g −ac
−c(a + e) −c(a + e) 2c2 + gE
 
.
Elementary calculations show that the determinant of G,det, equals u1ncunc. Moreover,
det ∗ G−1 equals
 g(2c2 + gE) + a(agE + c2(a − e)) a(c2(a − e) − egE)a c u nc
a(c2(a − e) − egE)g ( 2c2 + gE) + a(agE + c2(a − e)) acunc
c(a + e)unc c(a + e)unc unc(a2 + ae + g)
 
.
Consequently, matrix M satisﬁes




−φ4det − 2abφ1u1nc φ2
1u1nc φ2
1u1nc 0
b2gu1nc φ4det + bφ1u2nc bφ1gu3nc 0
b2gu1nc bφ1gu3nc φ4det + bφ1u2nc 0




where we used the shorthand notations u2nc := a3gE + ac2g + aggE − e2agE − c2ge
and u3nc := −c2e − gEe + ac2. Note that u2nc + gu3nc = (a − e)u1nc, a relationship





˜ a ˜ c ˜ c 0
˜ b ˜ d ˜ e 0
˜ b ˜ e ˜ d 0




The eigenvalues of M1a r e
˜ g, ˜ d −˜ e,
1
2




(˜ a − ˜ d −˜ e)2 + 8˜ b˜ c and
1
2




(˜ a − ˜ d −˜ e)2 + 8˜ b˜ c.
Note that the eigenvector corresponding to the eigenvalue ˜ d −˜ e is (01−10 )T,w h i c h
therefore does not satisfy the additional requirements for generating an equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, ˜ g<0. Consequently, the game has at most two different equilibria. Given258 VAN AARLE ET AL.
the parametric restrictions, it is easily veriﬁed that if r := ρ1/k1 < 1 (which implies that








(˜ a − ˜ d −˜ e)2 + 8˜ b˜ c>0.
So, under this assumption there is a unique equilibrium. A more detailed look at the
eigenvalues shows that they coincide with the relevant eigenvalues (with µ = 1a n d
θ = 0) reported in Engwerda et al. [9]. So, the results obtained there apply here. In
particular we have that whenever there is only one appropriate positive eigenvalue, this




−(˜ e + ˜ d − λ)/˜ b
1
1












−2φ4det − bφ1(3a − e)u1nc








−bφ1(a + e) +
  
−2φ4unc − bφ1(3a − e)




Consequently, the eigenvalue of M we are looking for is λ/det and
K :=K1 = K2
=
2b2g
−2φ4unc − bφ1(3a − e) +
  
−2φ4unc − bφ1(3a − e)
 2 + 8gb2φ2
1
.
Using this, the rest of the claims follow straightforwardly.
Next, consider the aggregate performance criterion J A
E.
Substitution of the various parameters into appendix A.1 shows that, except for the
entries (4,1), (4,2) and (4,3) which are now zero, matrix M in step (ii) of the algorithm
coincides with the matrix M we determined above for the national performance case.
Therefore, it is easily veriﬁed that the equilibrium strategies coincide. As a consequence,
the resulting systems coincide too.
B.2. The cooperative case
First we consider again the national performance case. Let dN := τ + (1 − 2τ)(dN
E /d).







2dNb2 dNb(a − e) −dNb(a − e) 0
dNb(a − e) dN(a2 + e2) + τg 2dNae −dNc(a + e)
−dNb(a − e) 2dNae dN(a2 + e2) + τg −dNc(a + e)
0 −dNc(a + e) −dNc(a + e) 2dNc2 + (dN − τ)gE


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So, with
A := φ4,B := φ1(−110 ), Q := 2dNb
2,S := dNb(a − e)(1 −10 )
and
R :=
 dN(a2 + e2) + τg 2dNae −dNc(a + e)
2dNae dN(a2 + e2) + τg −dNc(a + e)
−dNc(a + e) −dNc(a + e) 2dNc2 + (dN − τ)gE
 
we can calculate the Hamiltonian of the system Ham. Since all entries of this matrix are
scalar, it is easily veriﬁed that the positive eigenvalue equals
acN :=
  
A − BR−1ST 2 + BR−1BT 
Q − SR−1ST 
and its corresponding eigenvector
 
BR−1BT
A − BR−1ST + acN
 
.
From this, KcN immediately results. Appart from the determination of the inverse of R
things can be calculated straightforwardly now. Therefore, we conclude this part of the
subsection with the exposition of matrix R−1 (from which the veriﬁcation of correctness
is left to the reader). Introducing
u1cN := (dN − τ)
 









2 − 2aegE(dN − τ)
 
and the determinant of R, det := u1cNucN,w eh a v e
det ∗ R
−1 =
  u1cN + u2cN u2cN (a + e)cdNucN
u2cN u1cN + u2cN (a + e)cdNucN
(a + e)cdNucN (a + e)cdNucN (dN(a + e)2 + τg)ucN
 
.
Next, we consider the aggregate performance case. Let dA := (1 − 2τ)(dA
E/d). After
substitution of the parameters we see that matrix MA




2τb2 τb(a− e) −τb(a− e) 0
τb(a− e) τ(a2 + e2 + g)+ dA(a + e)2 2τae+ dA(a + e)2 −c(a + e)(τ + 2dA)
−τb(a− e) 2τae+ dA(a + e)2 τ(a2 + e2 + g)+ dA(a + e)2 −c(a + e)(τ + 2dA)





From this similar as in the national case the matrices Q,S and R result. Introducing





τg+ (τ + 2dA)(a + e)
2 
,
u2cA := τc2(τ + 2dA)(a − e)2 − 2dAgA
E
 
2τae+ dA(a + e)2 
and ucA := τ(g+ (a − e)2) the determinant of R,det,i s2 u1cAucA and
det ∗ R−1 =
  u2cA + 2u1cA u2cA (τ + 2dA)(a + e)cucA
u2cA u2cA + 2u1cA (τ + 2dA)(a + e)cucA
(τ + 2dA)(a + e)cucA (τ + 2dA)(a + e)cucA (τg + (a + e)2(τ + 2dA))ucA
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From this it is easily veriﬁed (using the fact that φ1 =− (φ4(a − e))/2b)t h a tt h eH a m i l -
tonian Ham equals
1
















g + (a − e)2 and KcA = τ




B.3. The coalition form (1,2)
First we consider again the national case. After substitution of the parameters we see







2b2 b(a − e) −b(a − e) 0
b(a − e) a2 + e2 + g 2ae −c(a + e)
−b(a − e) 2ae a2 + e2 + g −c(a + e)








 a2 + e2 + g 2ae −c(a + e)
2ae a2 + e2 + g −c(a + e)















elementary calculations show that the determinant of G,det, equals 1
4u1,(1,2)u(1,2).M o r e -





u1,(1,2) + 2u2,(1,2) 2u2,(1,2)
1
2u(1,2)c(a + e)
2u2,(1,2) u1,(1,2) + 2u2,(1,2)
1
2u(1,2)c(a + e)









2φ1b(a − e)u1,(1,2) φ2
1u1,(1,2) 0
1
4b2gu1,(1,2) φ4det + 1
2φ1b(a − e)u1,(1,2) 0
1
2
b2gu1,(1,2) φ1b(a − e)u1,(1,2) φ4det


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So, there is always a unique equilibrium. The with a(1,2) corresponding eigenvector is
 
−







The rest of the conclusions follow then immediately.
Next, we consider the aggregate performance case. After substitution of the para-
meters in the algorithm described in appendix A.3 we see that matrix G coincides with
(26) except for the last row which is multiplied by a factor two. Consequently the deter-
minant of G,det, equals 1
2u1,(1,2)u(1,2). After some elementary calculations we see that
det ∗ G−1 equals


u1,(1,2) + u2,(1,2) u2,(1,2)
1
4u(1,2)c(a + e)
u2,(1,2) u1,(1,2) + u2,(1,2)
1
4u(1,2)c(a + e)
u(1,2)c(a + e) u(1,2)c(a + e) 1
4u(1,2)(g + (a + e)2)

,
and matrix M(1,2) satisﬁes
det ∗ M(1,2) =
 −φ4det − φ1b(a − e)u1,(1,2) 2φ2
1u1,(1,2) 0
1




From this it is easily deduced that the only relevant positive eigenvalue a(1,2)A coincides
with a(1,2). Moreover, it is also easily veriﬁed that the corresponding K and strategies
coincide with the national case.
Appendix C













τg+ dN(a − e)2
=φ2
4
g(a − e)2(dN − τ)
(g + (a − e)2)(τg + dN(a − e)2)
 0.
(ii) First note that, using the equality φ4(a − e) =− 2bφ1,a nc can be rewritten as
1
2
φ4(a − e)(a + e) +  φ4 
 
(1
2(a + e)(a − e) + 2g)2 + 2g(a − e)2
2(a(a − e) + g)























Since t2  0, it is obvious that if t1 in the above expression is negative also a2
cN−a2
nc  0.
Nextassume that t1 ispositive. Then, a2
cN −a2
nc  0ifand only if t2
2−t2




























(3a + e) − gdN
 























τdN(a − e)(a + e)2
 
.
Obviously, this last expression is positive, if 3τ − 2dN  0, which concludes the proof.
(iii) For the non-cooperative case the proof can be found in Engwerda et al. [9].









g + (a − e)2 − τ
gφ2
4




g + (a − e)2
g





Proof of lemma 3. (i) From the cost functional (25) we have that
J N










b + pcN(a − e)
 2 − acN
 
b + pnc(a − e)
 2 
.













2bφ1 + (φ4 + acN)(a − e)
 2 − acN
 
2bφ1 + (φ4 + anc)(a − e)
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= sgn
 
(acN − anc)ancacN(a − e)
2 
= sgn(acN − anc).
(ii) From (24) we have that








b + pcN(a − e)






b + p(1,2)(a − e)




Using again the facts that pi = (φ4 + ai)/(2φ1), i ∈{ cN,(1,2)} and φ4(a − e) =
















































From lemma 2(i) we therefore conclude that










































(dN − τ)(a − e)
2 
 0,
which concludes the proof. 
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